by Ana Bazac<\/p>\n
It is more probable that the purpose of knowing how<\/em> was anterior to knowing what<\/em>. But would this conjecture be plausible when we all are used to consider that to know means to understand what <\/em>is in front of us, therefore, the what of things?<\/p>\n Well, first we should ask what knowing as such is. We wonder in front of little children who do not yet speak but, as their mothers say, \u201cknow everything\u201d. We will try to explain this but first let\u2019s deploy the meanings of \u201cto know\u201d.<\/p>\n Animals which normally implacably react to their environment seem to know very well the stimuli, the difference between edible entities or substances and non-edible \u201cuninteresting\u201d ones, the difference between friendly and inimical states and attitudes, between mates of the same species, and between mates of different ones. The answer that \u201cit\u2019s the instinct\u201d does explain noting since we follow another topic, the knowing as such and not the biological ways which they did occur through, and since the instinct as such was the genetic and nervous transposition of efficient reactions.<\/p>\n Just this little word \u2013 reactions<\/em> \u2013 helps us to decipher the object of our perplexity: because they show the first manner and, at the same time, proof of the consciousness of things. This first manner is the access consciousness<\/em>, the awareness of things in order to efficiently react to them<\/em>. As it was said, consciousness \u2013 thus neurons and their relations \u2013 was a biological tool forged in the development of animated beings in order to adapt them to the environment and efficiently react to it. The first kind of consciousness was \u2013 and is \u2013 the access consciousness. This kind is so important that it is anterior to the centralised nervous system[1]<\/a>. The concrete conditions of the animal determine it to associate<\/em> a condition with other and form an associative memory without which it could not cope. Associations are primary bricks of awareness: of the identity of the animal and of the difference between it and the environment. As well as of the difference between elements of this environment.<\/p>\n Now we could dare to refer to the little children. (And obviously, we exclude here the influence of words transmitted by mothers etc.). They have a good awareness of things, an access consciousness. They are not only aware of their being \u2013 and the difference between their being and the environment \u2013 but also of difference between things in this environment. On this basis of associations \u2013 in mente <\/em>\u2013 they react. The access consciousness is the consciousness of reactions on the basis of discrimination between things[2]<\/strong><\/a><\/em>.<\/p>\n Can we say that the little children know? We can, the more so the associative access consciousness allow them to react according to the differences between things, not for nothing equating we the state to be aware with knowing. This is as<\/em> knowing how: but to know how<\/em> is not reducible to the access consciousness. However, the little children know only at the level of knowing how to react.<\/p>\n The second manner of consciousness is the phenomenal <\/em>one, actually the phenomenological<\/em>: that when the little children focus on a distinct thing and try to understand what<\/em> is it. The phenomenological consciousness is that of searching and being aware of the meanings <\/em>of things. But can these meanings be understood on the \u201csimple\u201d basis of awareness of things, of their presence? How can the humans \u2013 from here it\u2019s rather the moment to say our goodbyes to prehuman animals \u2013 arrive to meanings, to know what <\/em>is the phenomenon<\/em> in front of them?<\/p>\n The phenomenological consciousness is possible through communication<\/em>. Communication is made through imitation<\/em>: apart from association \u2013 when, for instance, to crying means for the infant that mother etc. will come soon and everything will be fine \u2013, this is the basis of learning (once more, we exclude here the instincts), thus of formation of long memory. \u00a0But neither imitation leads to more than finer associations. Because: the what <\/em>is discovered to the child through the instrumentality of words<\/em>.<\/p>\n By learning the language transmitted by mother etc., the child learns a new type of associations: that between things (so, including relations and qualities) and meaningful sounds.\u00a0 The words are not random sounds which eventually have meanings to the child when he transmits sounds to the world in order to indicate he is hungry etc. The words deploy in front of him new aspects towards which he was not attentive when he only noticed the existence of things. The words teach the child the peculiarity<\/em> of things: that they are phenomena <\/em>which he can claim even though these phenomena are not present, or which are surface qualities like colours, or which express movements etc.<\/p>\n The correspondence between words and phenomena are a prime moment of the phenomenological consciousness: without it one cannot arrive to meanings of things. And it is nowise a moment that \u201cwas\u201d, so would no longer be important after one learned to speak. This arrogancy of pseudo-intellectuals manifests just through not having the propriety of words<\/em>: through using any word fortuitously, not really knowing its meaning and considering that the listeners\/the readers are as shallow as they are.<\/p>\n But just on the basis of words \u2013 whose correspondence with things was well retained \u2013 can one understand the situations<\/em>, the concrete arrangement of things and the permanent new experiences when even the old words are better understood, while always learning new ones and new arrangements of words. The phenomenal consciousness develops in the course of experiences. It represents the articulation of relations and aspects of the world with the help of words<\/em>, that is, the articulation of meanings of the world<\/em>.<\/p>\n To be conscious about articulation and meanings is to have a meta<\/em> look on the entire process of awareness[3]<\/a>. The access consciousness and the phenomenal consciousness intertwin[4]<\/a>, but in order to control them and their intertwining it is necessary a verification: the meta<\/em> look[5]<\/a> concerns not only the accuracy of access and responses which involve more and more better knowledge of the what of things, including of feelings, but also the internal coherence of the criteria and judgements\/meta<\/em> look the consciousness is able to have about its own decisions. Logic \u2013 as inner logical structuring \u2013 is meta <\/em>look. It forms with the access and phenomenal consciousness an intertwined whole<\/em>. In this, the consciousness is the most transparent: it cannot hide to itself its own exploits: not the others are the most intransigent judges of its behaviour, but itself.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n This chapter was the introduction of our basic question, what does to know<\/em> mean. It is more than to react efficiently, and even more than to understand the meanings of things \u2013 even though by understanding these meanings it seems they are the what<\/em> \u2013 and somehow even more than the meta<\/em> look. It is all together, and it is a social <\/em>and evolutive<\/em> process, and not a solipsistic copy or interpretation of the world.<\/p>\n If so, we can pass to another step in the unravelling of our topic, the knowing what<\/em> and the knowing what for<\/em>.<\/p>\n The knowing is not a spontaneous \u201cnatural\u201d process: it is natural, of course[6]<\/a>, but it is deployed with the help of language and it is learned. To know is to learn to know. In this respect, to know how<\/em>, although it can be a metaphor for the access consciousness (and vice versa), involves to put consciously the question \u201chow\u201d. And to know what<\/em> implies to put consciously the question \u201cwhat\u201d, only metaphorically being it a synonym of the phenomenological consciousness. Therefore, to know how and what means to have put consciously those questions, i.e., to consider these questions themselves as problems, objects of reflection.<\/p>\n The problem of questions as problems was highlighted by Aristotle. As it is known, he was not preoccupied with the know how<\/em>: somehow this aspect was considered a result of know what<\/em>, and on the other hand, it was exterior to the interest of wisdom lovers. Not only because of the historical separation between the practical and intellectual labour, but also because the what<\/em> was so unknown, incomprehensible beyond the surface aspects allowing the reactions of humans towards them, that it was the absolute priority of the systematic intellectual labour. (This is the reason ontology was first).<\/p>\n But Aristotle was the genius who related the knowing what<\/em> to the causes <\/em>the humans are searching for because otherwise they would not understand the succession, order and the concrete things as such.<\/p>\n The causes are the reasons things are as they are for. But, in front of the infinity of concrete things, without considering all of them, so all<\/em> the reasons of their existence as such, it is not possible to understand even their existence. In order to understand this the causes can be reduced<\/em>, and there is no exception that can falsify this reduction. The causes are: material<\/em>, formal<\/em>, efficient<\/em>, telic<\/em>. By answering and only by answering to the questions about the concrete <\/em>material, formal, efficient and telic causes, one understands the what <\/em>of every concrete<\/em> thing. Outside this explanation, there is only a hover in the realm of abstractions: yes, there is\/we can conceive a basic apeiron <\/em>(Anaximander) \u2013 or, in Aristotle\u2019s term, hyle<\/em> \u2013 as well as there are basic forces as attraction and repulson, or basic opposites as hot and cold etc., but this cannot explain how did the concrete things with their individuality appear or rather what is the relationship between those logical suppositions and the concrete things.<\/p>\n Accordingly, it seems futile to stay in the domain of abstractions without relate them to the concrete things. Because only they exist: not Ideas, and neither abstract concepts. The world is constituted of substances<\/em> \u2013 concrete unities of matter<\/em> and form<\/em>, the form is what gives the concrete appearance of things[7]<\/a>; and obviously, these unities cannot be understood as \u2013 and are not \u2013 random \u201ccombinations\u201d, but occur as results of other unities, each of which being cause and effect at the same time and to different things \/ on different layers of existence; every concrete thing is an efficient<\/em> cause; and \u2013 pay attention \u2013 every concrete thing appear as a result of its inner telos<\/em>, responding to the teloi<\/em> of its causes, and is born\u00a0 and develops by its own energy that corelates the energy and teloi<\/em> of its and other causes and arrives to the reason-to-be<\/em> of the concrete thing: this telos<\/em> gives to the thing the \u00a0unique persistence during its dynamical constitution in the dynamical constitution of its causes and of the whole domain it is part of.<\/p>\n If so, even though the form is a first order phenomenal cause of the unicity of a concrete thing, both matter and form and the efficient causes of this unity explain only the \u201cmechanical\u201d, structural constitution of a concrete thing. The big question is why a certain concrete thing exists at all in the concert of the world. The answer is its reason-to-be<\/em> in this concert \u2013 and thus, in its own entity \u2013 and the telos <\/em>cause is the second order, deep phenomenal cause of the unicity of a concrete thing.<\/p>\n The telos<\/em> is the what for<\/em> and thus knowing what <\/em>involves knowing what for<\/em>. Telos<\/em>, this fourth cause and the deployment of knowing what for<\/em> should have not caused and should not cause special troubles when searching the what<\/em> of things. Nevertheless, they have caused and still cause: although in order to know what<\/em> a certain thing is one must answer to the four causes, actually, people have separated the fourth cause from the preceding three ones.<\/p>\n Consequently, the telos<\/em> appeared as something strange, external to the thing, and thus not necessary to it, nor to its understanding. This is the reason it appeared mostly in idealistic worldviews and philosophies. Here, the telos<\/em> was similarly external to things but nevertheless determining them.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n Why did people separate the telos <\/em>from the things? Because they did not know their what<\/em>: the intertwining of \u201cmatter and form\u201d was so difficult that it occupied the entire scientific endeavour. The more so it seemed that the positive scientific search of the what <\/em>was enough to efficiently act on it. And because, when firstly focusing on the knowing how<\/em>, the structural-functional aspects of things were enough and, obviously, sine qua non<\/em>.<\/p>\n Nowadays we know that to know how<\/em> intimately involves to know what<\/em>. And it\u2019s very difficult: both to know how<\/em> and to know what<\/em>. It is so difficult, that there are people who endeavour to know what<\/em> and there are people who endeavour to know how<\/em>. This real or apparent separation once more led to the removing of the question of what for<\/em>.<\/p>\n But is this removal real if to know how <\/em>is based on the very conscious aim of knowing the means by which one arrives to the what<\/em>? It is real, because the purpose of knowing the means \u2013 without which, indeed, the knowledge of the real constitution of things, from astronomy to cells and molecular, atomic and subatomic elements and functioning, would be impossible and to know would remain in the area of hypotheses \u2013 was clearly subordinated to the concrete knowledge of a concrete what<\/em>, but obviously exterior to the research of this concrete what<\/em>; and because the advance of knowing what <\/em>seemed to ignore the how <\/em>both as material and methodological means and as reactions and activities towards the new cognoscible reality achieved following the interdependent development of knowing what<\/em> and knowing how<\/em>.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n The above must not be considered too esoterically expressed. Both in science and the common knowledge and behaviour of people know by separating the knowing what<\/em> from the knowing how<\/em> and the two from the search of what for<\/em>. Otherwise, there would not be progress in knowledge. But this epistemological situation is not the only cause of the separation. The other one is education, determined not only by the epistemological situation but also by social ones. The less people know what for<\/em>, the easier they are controlled. They are given tasks which they have to fulfil.<\/p>\n Scientists were taught in this way: and a main moment in this education is to forbid them to know the real state of things which, if known, would determine them to be preoccupied with what for<\/em>. They are kept away from the real state of things[8]<\/a>, and they even think that a respectable scientist must be apolitical.<\/p>\n Science means to doubt <\/em>and verify<\/em> the hypotheses<\/em>. And scientists do this: only in this way can we explain the truthfulness of theories, without which one cannot go further them. But at the same time, the same \u201capolitical\u201d scientists substitute the doubt, verification and hypotheses with the \u201ccertainty\u201d of the only official truth about the what for<\/em>.<\/p>\n The absolute freedom of science to research the odder problems \u2013 and to freely collectively verify its cognisance \u2013 are sine qua non<\/em>: not only for its own logic and progress, but also for humankind. But this requirement has noting to do with the extra scientific condition of science to apply it irrespective of the consequences of this application. On the contrary, the freedom of science demands its free financial and material support, the free exercise of the critical thinking inside and outside it and thus, the development of mass basis of its workers. The weaker is the mass education, the lesser the mass basis of scientists is, so the fewer scientists are. The present elitist education and arrangement of society is a poison for science.<\/p>\n To know does not mean only to know what<\/em> and how<\/em>. It means also to know what for<\/em>. The lagging behind of this knowledge is proved by the present incredible opposition between the extraordinary soar and development of science and, on the other hand, the real state of the world society: as if<\/em> this state would be a primitive one, when it was not knowledge; when it was not science.<\/p>\n Well, again, if the development of science means knowing what and how, it\u2019s the tragic lagging behind of the knowing what for<\/em> that is missing. So, let\u2019s push it forward.<\/p>\n \n # Notes<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Gaelle Botton-Amiot, Pedro Martinez, and Simon G. Sprecher, \u201cAssociative learning in the cnidarian Nematostella vectensis<\/em>\u201d, PNAS, <\/em>Vol 120, No 13, 2023, e2220685120; Jan Bielecki et al., \u201cAssociative learning in the box jellyfish Tripedalia Cystophora<\/em>\u201d, Current Biology<\/em>, September 2023.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> This is the basic pattern of AI.<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> Anastasia Efklides, Plousia Misailidi (Eds.), Trends and Prospects in Metacognition Research<\/em>, New York, Springer, 2010.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> Charles Siewert, \u201cRespecting Appearances\u201d, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology<\/em>, edited by Dan Zahavi, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Asher Koriat, \u201cThe Feeling of Knowing: Some Metatheoretical Implications for Consciousness and Control\u201d, Consciousness and Cognition<\/em>, 9, 2000, pp. 149\u2013171; Uriah Kriegel, \u201cThe Concept of Consciousness in the Cognitive Sciences: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice\u201d, in P. Thagard (Ed.), Handbook of Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science<\/em>, Amsterdam, North Holland, 2006, pp. 195-217.<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> Even though \u201cmost men live as if each of them had a private intelligence of his own\u201d, Heraclitus, The Complete Fragments<\/em>, 2, Translation and Commentary and the Greek Text, William Harris, 1994,\u00a0 http:\/\/wayback.archive-it.org\/6670\/20161201175133\/http:\/\/community.middlebury.edu\/~harris\/Philosophy\/Heraclitus.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> Ana Bazac, \u201cFidelity towards forms: an ontological approach\u201d I, Agathos:<\/em> An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences<\/em>, Volume 5, issue 2, 2014, pp. 52-62; \u201cFidelity towards forms: an ontological approach\u201d, II, Agathos:<\/em> An International Review of the Humanities and Social Sciences<\/em>, Volume 6, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 24-40.<\/p>\n\n
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