de Alexandru Voicescu<\/p>\n
\u201cTo become a work of art is the object of living.\u201d \u2013 \u00cen prelegerea sus\u021binut\u0103 de la Dartmouth College \u00een toamna anului 1980[1]<\/a>, Michel Foucault traseaz\u0103 c\u00e2teva linii ale subiectiviz\u0103rii \u00een\u021beleas\u0103 ca un \u00eenceput de hermeneutic\u0103 a sinelui \u0219i ca ac\u021biune de critic\u0103 a propriului subiect. Supunerea (assujettissement<\/em>) \u0219i subiectivarea (subjectivation<\/em>) sunt cele dou\u0103 pliuri prin care individul situat \u00eentr-o istorie aprioric\u0103[2]<\/strong><\/a><\/em> nu doar se conformeaz\u0103, se ajusteaz\u0103 pe sine reglement\u0103rilor externe, regimurilor de adev\u0103r, mecanismelor de putere care domin\u0103 asupra sa, dar \u00ee\u0219i impune \u0219i o guvernare de sine ca reinventare permanent\u0103, \u00eentr-un prezent continuu de reflec\u021bie a ceea ce este, ca sarcin\u0103 a propriei vie\u021bi, grija de sine, le souci de soi<\/em>, epimeleia heautou<\/em>. Aceast\u0103 \u00eengrijire a propriului sine, o adev\u0103rat\u0103 guvernare de sine, este menit\u0103, \u00eentr-un timp \u00eentotdeauna actual[3]<\/a>, a transforma propria persoan\u0103 ca rezultat al unei arte a existen\u021bei, o manifestare a propriei tr\u0103iri, o responsabilitate de devenire a sa. Via\u021ba este o oper\u0103 de art\u0103 \u0219i suntem responsabili pentru realizarea \u0219i ducerea la bun sf\u00e2r\u0219it a propriei opere, ne spune Foucault[4]<\/a>.<\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n Tehnica transformativ\u0103 a askesis<\/em>-ului \u0219i veridic\u021bia \u00een\u021beleas\u0103 ca parrhesia<\/em> se afl\u0103 sub iminen\u021ba unei duble mor\u021bi \u0219i a unei duble na\u0219teri. Prima \u201emoarte\u201c este cea a esen\u021bei, a originii, a fundamentului pozitiv, categorial, ce permitea \u00eencep\u00e2nd cu Platon apari\u021bia \u0219i rezisten\u021ba (an)istoric\u0103 a unui plan care trebuie c\u0103utat, descoperit \u0219i urmat, acel adev\u0103r mai mult sau mai pu\u021bin vizibil care st\u0103 ascuns sub pecetea cunoa\u0219terii. Cunoa\u0219terea a fost inventat\u0103, dar adev\u0103rul a fost inventat \u0219i mai t\u00e2rziu[5]<\/a>. Adev\u0103rul coresponden\u021b\u0103 a disp\u0103rut \u0219i odat\u0103 cu el a disp\u0103rut \u0219i mitul originii. La mort de l’homme<\/em> anun\u021bat\u0103 \u00een Les Mots et les Choses<\/em> este o dispari\u021bie a subiectului aflat \u00een centrul obiectualit\u0103\u021bii (res cogitans<\/em> care examineaz\u0103 lumea) \u0219i obiect supus subiectivit\u0103\u021bii (res extensa<\/em> ce se examineaz\u0103 pe sine), dispari\u021bie a acelei capacit\u0103\u021bi aproape \u201emitologice\u201c (masca lui Nietzsche[6]<\/a>) de a fi \u00een aceea\u0219i m\u0103sur\u0103 \u0219i existen\u021b\u0103 a posibilit\u0103\u021bii (lucrurile sunt, apar \u00een fiin\u021b\u0103 \u00een m\u0103sura \u00een care le v\u0103d noetic), \u0219i posibilitate a existen\u021bei (existen\u021ba mea este o manifestare a limitelor date de propriile condi\u021bii de vizualizare noematice)[7]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Cea de a doua \u201emoarte\u201c este chiar cea a omului ca individ, realitatea permanent\u0103 a mor\u021bii personale, finalul subiectivit\u0103\u021bii prin excelen\u021b\u0103, care oblig\u0103 \u00een inevitabilitatea sa la adoptarea unui comportament pe de o parte de diagnosticare[8]<\/a> a propriei vie\u021bi, a trecutului \u0219i a viitorului deopotriv\u0103, c\u00e2t \u0219i a prezentului actualizat (trecutul fiind descenden\u021b\u0103 a prezentului \u0219i viitorul \u0219i el o punere \u00een act a prezentului, devenir<\/em> deleuzian, o desp\u0103r\u021bire de identitatea fix\u0103, pragul unui eveniment), pe de alt\u0103 parte oblig\u00e2nd la o responsabilitate a ceea ce sunt, o autocorec\u021bie constant\u0103[9]<\/a>, o balansare interioar\u0103 a for\u021belor care anim\u0103 lupta interioar\u0103, un techne<\/em> creativ, un me\u0219te\u0219ug al propriei vie\u021bi aflate sub spectrul mor\u021bii[10]<\/a>. Melete thanatou<\/em> reprezint\u0103 un pas sub\u00een\u021beles c\u0103tre ethos[11]<\/strong><\/a><\/em>, acel spa\u021biu de manifestare a sinelui delimitat de hotarul temporal al propriei vie\u021bi. Avem o obliga\u021bie de a ne tr\u0103i via\u021ba \u00eentr-un mod etic pentru c\u0103 putem muri \u00een orice zi, ne spun stoicii. Trebuie s\u0103 ne dovedim demni de ceea ce suntem, s\u0103 ne guvern\u0103m potrivit cu propria autenticitate ca o experien\u021b\u0103 reflexiv\u0103 ce dezvolt\u0103 un tip de pseudo-coresponden\u021b\u0103 a adev\u0103rului din sine cu cel al faptelor proprii, indiferent de risc (parrhesia<\/em>).<\/p>\n Cele dou\u0103 \u201ena\u0219teri\u201c simbolice pe care le declan\u0219eaz\u0103 tehnica transformativ\u0103 sunt \u00een oglind\u0103. O prim\u0103 na\u0219tere a subiectului este Entstehung<\/em>-ul nietzschean, apari\u021bia, formarea, crearea, ivirea a ceea ce se manifest\u0103 \u00een momentul prezent permanent (rezultat al eternei re\u00eentoarceri) prin aducerea \u00een lumin\u0103 a luptei dintre for\u021bele care \u00ee\u0219i caut\u0103 preeminen\u021ba una asupra alteia. Apari\u021bia, manifestarea ini\u021bial\u0103 const\u0103 \u00een intrarea \u00een joc a for\u021belor formatoare, eruperea \u00eentr-o scen\u0103 central\u0103 impersonal\u0103, un spa\u021biu care desparte energii primare contrare, o zon\u0103 de vid prin intermediul c\u0103ruia instinctele \u00ee\u0219i fac schimburile de gesturi, se incit\u0103 unele pe altele \u0219i \u00ee\u0219i arog\u0103 vorbele de amenin\u021bare. A\u0219a cum cobor\u00e2rea spre o non-origine, v\u0103zut\u0103 ca Herkunft<\/em>, indic\u0103 puterea \u0219i sl\u0103biciunea unui instinct \u0219i \u00eenscrierea sa \u00een trup, apari\u021bia, manifestarea primar\u0103 marcheaz\u0103 un loc al confrunt\u0103rilor, dar nu ca un c\u00e2mp \u00eenchis care s\u0103 ofere un spectacol \u00eentre egali, ci ca un non-spa\u021biu, o distan\u021b\u0103 pur\u0103, capabil\u0103 s\u0103 eviden\u021bieze adversit\u0103\u021bile. Na\u0219terea-apari\u021bie cu rol de condi\u021bie de posibilitate a subiectului nu apar\u021bine cuiva anume, pentru c\u0103 nimeni nu poate s\u0103 fie cel responsabil pentru generarea manifest\u0103rii ontologice. Apari\u021bia are loc \u00een spa\u021biul intersti\u021bial, \u00eentr-un non-loc \u00een care se repet\u0103 la infinit jocul domina\u021biilor \u0219i \u00een care dominarea unui anumite for\u021be asupra alteia duce la diferen\u021bierea valorilor \u0219i genereaz\u0103 ideea de libertate \u0219i de logic\u0103. Aceast\u0103 rela\u021bie de dominare este \u0219i ea un non-loc, nu o rela\u021bie propriu-zis\u0103, fiind fixat\u0103 istoric \u00een ritualuri impersonale, proceduri meticuloase care impun drepturi \u0219i obliga\u021bii \u0219i stabilesc semne, m\u0103rci de putere cu valen\u021b\u0103 juridic\u0103 ce graveaz\u0103 amintiri pe lucruri \u0219i chiar pe trupuri, d\u00e2nd na\u0219tere universului de reguli menit nu s\u0103 tempereze violen\u021ba, ci s\u0103 o satisfac\u0103.[12]<\/a> O na\u0219tere \u201edur\u0103\u201c, a\u0219adar, goal\u0103 \u00een sine, violent\u0103 \u0219i nefinalizat\u0103, neapar\u021bin\u00e2nd cuiva, dar \u00eentip\u0103rit\u0103 \u00een orice subiect al epocii moderne.<\/p>\n Moartea omului ca un corolar al mor\u021bii lui Dumnezeu (Gott ist tot<\/em> este ea \u00eens\u0103\u0219i apari\u021bie a omului, de altfel) este \u0219i na\u0219terea unui spa\u021biu de permisiune a individualiz\u0103rii, de alegere, de apucare (un greifen<\/em> ce apuc\u0103 din locul proxim pentru apropriere \u0219i un begreifen<\/em> ca subjugare cognitiv\u0103 a lucrului apropriat). Subiectul \u00een devenirea sa ca subiect individualizabil ia din spa\u021biul ontic permis, non-locul de intersti\u021biu \u00een care se afl\u0103 elementele fundamentale ale propriei poten\u021bialit\u0103\u021bi de constituire, pentru a se personaliza prin varia\u021bii proprii. Aici se petrece cea de a doua na\u0219tere, unic\u0103, autentic\u0103, creativ\u0103, ca act motric, vital, ce nu se opre\u0219te \u00een mi\u0219carea sa. Aici apare omul ca entitate pseudo-unitar\u0103, identificabil\u0103. Spa\u021biul exterior se \u00eenscrie \u00een spa\u021biul interior, Cel\u0103lalt ca totalitate a unui apriori<\/em> istoric se \u00eentip\u0103re\u0219te \u00een sine prin gheara unui angreifen<\/em>, unui atac ce predomin\u0103, c\u00e2\u0219tig\u0103 \u00eentr-un moment individual de acalmie, doar pentru ca un alt atac s\u0103 r\u0103bufneasc\u0103 imediat, animat de noi for\u021be opuse, autofage[13]<\/a>.<\/p>\n A\u0219adar putem spune c\u0103 subiectul moare \u0219i istoric, din perspectiv\u0103 regresiv\u0103, genealogic\u0103, dovedindu-se acum, dinspre noi, o inven\u021bie de dat\u0103 recent\u0103, \u0219i se \u0219i na\u0219te \u00een acela\u0219i timp ca parte a unei re\u021bele disparate de evenimente care \u00eei dau constitutivitate. Dizolvarea unit\u0103\u021bii subiectului \u00een cadrul istoriei eficiente (l’histoire<\/em> \u00ab effective \u00bb<\/em>[14]<\/strong><\/em><\/a>, efectiv\u0103 ca prezen\u021b\u0103 a unui efect ulterior, eficient\u0103 ca generatoare de for\u021b\u0103) elibereaz\u0103 acele elemente din sine care permit subversiunea \u0219i distrugerea, drumul spre un sacrificiu al subiectului cunoa\u0219terii[15]<\/a>. Cunoa\u0219tere care este cu totul diferit\u0103 de cea \u0219tiin\u021bific\u0103 \u0219i epistemologic\u0103 \u00een sens clasic (adev\u0103r pe care Foucault \u00eel denume\u0219te adev\u0103r-demonstra\u021bie, ghidat de principiul omniprezen\u021bei \u0219i al accesului universal) \u0219i a c\u0103rei exercitare are, deci, un alt rezultat, o alt\u0103 \u201eeficien\u021b\u0103\u201c dec\u00e2t cea categorial\u0103[16]<\/a>. Este adev\u0103rul discontinuu, dispersat, al profe\u021bilor, al divinatorilor, inocen\u021bilor, confesionalilor, al nebunilor, \u00een\u021belep\u021bilor etc. Un adev\u0103r care nu este universal, dar care are caracteristici \u00eentemeietoare, de apari\u021bie a unui eveniment, \u0219i care nu anun\u021b\u0103 un raport de ordine \u00eentre obiect \u0219i subiect, nu are drept con\u021binut un raport de cunoa\u0219tere, ci unul de \u0219oc, de h\u0103ituire, riscant \u0219i beligerant. Un raport de putere \u00een care adev\u0103rul demonstrativ \u00ee\u0219i ia, paradoxal, for\u021ba din interiorul adev\u0103rului eveniment[17]<\/a>. Acesta este spa\u021biul brut din care subiectivitatea se serve\u0219te \u00een pofta sa de apari\u021bie pentru constituirea ca tehnic\u0103 transformativ\u0103. Adev\u0103rul nu este niciodat\u0103 oferit subiectului ca un drept al s\u0103u[18]<\/a> \u0219i subiectul trebuie s\u0103 prind\u0103 acest adev\u0103r propriu printr-o schimbare de sine, printr-o extensie a ceea ce e c\u0103tre ceea ce poate fi, o conversie elaborativ\u0103 \u00een care adev\u0103rul apare \u00een sinele subiectului printr-o mi\u0219care de iluminare a eros<\/em>-ului (dorin\u021b\u0103, o mi\u0219care ascendent\u0103, de accedere) \u0219i una de progresie a askesis<\/em>-ului (oprire, \u00eenfr\u00e2nare infirm\u0103, responsabilitatea unei ac\u021biuni laborioase de sine)[19]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Foucault consider\u0103 c\u0103 pentru elaborarea oric\u0103rei teorii a subiectivit\u0103\u021bii este necesar\u0103 dep\u0103\u0219irea nu numai a perspectivei pozitiviste a cunoa\u0219terii obiective \u0219i cea structuralist\u0103 a sistemelor de semnifica\u021bii[20]<\/a>, ci \u0219i abordarea marxist\u0103 care ideologizeaz\u0103 \u0219i ascunde o realitate politic\u0103 inerent\u0103 discursului umanist \u0219i schema freudian\u0103 a interioriz\u0103rii regulilor ca acceptare de c\u0103tre un sine con\u0219tient. Aceste posibilit\u0103\u021bi de teoretizare sunt limitate pentru c\u0103 nu dezv\u0103luie complet mecanismul istoric al constituirii de sine, realizare a faptului c\u0103 nu posed\u0103m un singur suflet nemuritor, ci o multitudine de suflete muritoare care ne arat\u0103 nu o identitate uitat\u0103, gata s\u0103 se renasc\u0103, \u0219i nici una teleologic\u0103, \u00eendreptat\u0103 spre un viitor ideal \u0219i inevitabil. Situarea subiectului este rezultat al ac\u021biunii unui sistem complex de elemente distincte[21]<\/a> care nu pot fi st\u0103p\u00e2nite de c\u0103tre puterile sintezei[22]<\/a>. Nu avem o ordine interpretativ\u0103 (hermeneutic\u0103, \u00een cazul cre\u0219tinismului \u0219i al s\u0103u confesional[23]<\/a>) \u00een afara regimurilor de adev\u0103r \u0219i a ac\u021biunilor critice \u0219i nu putem ajunge la o critic\u0103 transformativ\u0103 f\u0103r\u0103 o genealogie ca ontologie critic\u0103 a prezentului. Istoricul \u0219i contingentul nu ne oblig\u0103 s\u0103 accept\u0103m un anumit regim de adev\u0103r, nu avem o descoperire natural\u0103 sau necesar\u0103 pe care s\u0103 o \u00eembr\u0103\u021bi\u0219\u0103m \u00een subiectivitate \u0219i care s\u0103 ne \u00eendrume \u00een via\u021ba noastr\u0103. Din contr\u0103, subiectivizarea \u00eenseamn\u0103 s\u0103 folosim o libertate, o alegere pe de o parte reactiv\u0103, de \u00eempotrivire la ordinea care vine asupra noastr\u0103, dar de supunere (assujettissement<\/em>) con\u0219tient\u0103[24]<\/a> c\u0103tre o putere de tip juridic, \u0219i subiectivarea creativ\u0103 (subjectivation<\/em>) a accept\u0103rii propriei elabor\u0103ri de sine, pe de alt\u0103 parte. Ace\u0219ti doi pa\u0219i sunt lega\u021bi \u00eempreun\u0103 \u0219i \u00eempreun\u0103 constituie subiectul. Nu exist\u0103 subiect \u00een afara procesului de supunere (puterea cunoa\u0219tere pozitiv\u0103) \u0219i a procesului de subiectivare (asumare a unui exerci\u021biu vital). Subiectul el \u00eensu\u0219i este un proces[25]<\/a>, un efect de ac\u021bionare, opera\u021bionalizare[26]<\/a>, un prezent creat. Supunerea (assujettissement<\/em>) nu vine doar din afar\u0103, impus\u0103 indivizilor, ci este o implicare \u00een exercitarea adev\u0103rului \u00een fa\u021ba unei autorit\u0103\u021bi, precum m\u0103rturisirea sau confesiunea, \u0219i o terapie a adev\u0103rului, \u00een acela\u0219i timp, precum cazul doctorului Fran\u00e7ois Leuret, \u00een care pacientul \u00ee\u0219i recunoa\u0219te delirul \u00een urma du\u0219urilor reci. \u00cens\u0103 ac\u021biunea asupra sinelui doar prin aceast\u0103 supunere \u201eslab\u0103\u201c nu ar fi dec\u00e2t o \u201emoarte\u201c a subiectului (\u0219i ea \u201eslab\u0103\u201c, la r\u00e2ndul s\u0103u, dar nu mai pu\u021bin tanatic, oprimare ca sublimare), nu ar capta dec\u00e2t par\u021bial rela\u021bia de for\u021be din spa\u021biul non-loc \u00een care se manifest\u0103 genealogia subiectului. Ar fi, \u00een ontologia critic\u0103 a prezentului, o r\u0103m\u00e2nere \u00een urm\u0103, o uitare a subiectului, un decalaj fa\u021b\u0103 de sine care nu ar mai permite demascarea capcanei guvern\u0103rii de c\u0103tre cel\u0103lalt, respectiv retragerea voin\u021bei \u0219i deschiderea spa\u021biului de contra-voin\u021b\u0103[27]<\/a>. Subiectul are datoria nu numai de a r\u0103spunde la putere, dar \u0219i de a produce \u0219i \u201epublica\u201c[28]<\/a> adev\u0103rul propriu. Gnothi seauton<\/em> devine astfel insuficient pentru subiectivizare, desp\u0103r\u021bind exteriorul (posibil \u201er\u0103u\u201c ca domina\u021bie, partea negativ\u0103 din putere \u0219i din ethos<\/em>) de obiectul interior (subiectul transformat \u00een simplu obiect definit ca cel asupra c\u0103ruia se aplic\u0103 dominarea). Apare necesitatea unui pas suplimentar, de coeziune a planurilor, de spa\u021bializare f\u0103r\u0103 discontinuit\u0103\u021bi, un exerci\u021biu de \u00eengrijire, epimeleia heautou<\/em>.[29]<\/a><\/p>\n ***<\/p>\n Grija de sine induce \u0219i un discurs, \u0219i o menire: este \u0219i subiect al cunoa\u0219terii, \u0219i subiect al voin\u021bei, un gnome<\/em> grecesc ca unitate prin care adev\u0103rul transpare cu \u00eentreaga sa for\u021b\u0103 \u0219i se imprim\u0103 \u00een sufletul (persoana) omului[30]<\/a>. Sinele gnomic<\/em> dezv\u0103luie necesitatea discursului parrhesiastic<\/em>, acceptarea unui adev\u0103r ca fiind propriu \u0219i cu valoare indicativ\u0103 \u0219i, \u00een final (ca loc de manifestare, margine a evenimentului, nu ca finitudine), la constituirea subiectivit\u0103\u021bii creative, la noi modalit\u0103\u021bi de a fi[31]<\/a>. \u201eMoartea\u201c \u0219i \u201ena\u0219terea\u201c subiectului se \u00eembin\u0103 ca dou\u0103 pliuri \u00eentre dincolo \u0219i dincoace[32]<\/a>, constituind o profunzime, o stratificare retras\u0103 \u00een sine[33]<\/a>.<\/p>\n Exerci\u021biul esteticii existen\u021bei denot\u0103 aducerea \u00een permanen\u021b\u0103 a actului de alteritate prin excelen\u021b\u0103: inventarea propriei vie\u021bi fa\u021b\u0103 de cel\u0103lalt care este tocmai interiorul intim, lupta autofag\u0103. Curajul crea\u021biei de sine de dinainte de memento<\/em>-ul ultim, confruntarea cu adev\u0103rul final. \u00ab Ce sur quoi je voudrais insister pour finir c’est ceci : il n’y a pas d’instauration de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 sans une position essentielle de l’alt\u00e9rit\u00e9. La v\u00e9rit\u00e9, ce n’est jamais le m\u00eame. Il ne peut y avoir de v\u00e9rit\u00e9 que dans la forme de l’autre monde et de la vie autre. \u00bb[34]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Bibliografie primar\u0103:<\/strong><\/p>\n DELEUZE, Gilles, Foucault<\/em>, Les \u00c9ditions de Minuit, 2013, versiune ePub<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, \u201eSubjectivity And Truth\u201c \u0219i \u201eChristianity And Confession\u201c, \u00een Political Theory<\/em>, Vol. 21, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 198-227<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, Les Mots et les Choses<\/em>, Gallimard, 1966<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, Le discours philosophique<\/em>, Seuil\/EHESS\/Gallimard, 2023<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, \u201eOne Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault, October 25, 1982\u201c, intervievat de Rux Martin, \u00een Technologies of the Self. A Seminar with Michel Foucault<\/em>, Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (eds.), The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, Le\u00e7ons sur la volont\u00e9 de savoir. Cours au Coll\u00e8ge de France (1970-1971)<\/em>, Seuil\/Gallimard, 2011<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, Le pouvoir psychiatrique. Cours au Coll\u00e8ge de France (1973-1974)<\/em>, Seuil\/Gallimard, 2003<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, L’herm\u00e9neutique du sujet. Cours au Coll\u00e8ge de France (1981-1982)<\/em>, Seuil\/Gallimard, 2001<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, Le Courage de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9, Le gouvernement de soi et des autres II. Cours au Coll\u00e8ge de France (1983-1984)<\/em>, Seuil\/Gallimard, 2009<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, \u201eNietzsche, g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie, l’histoire\u201c, \u00een<\/em> Dits et \u00e9crits<\/em>,\u00a0 Vol. 2, Gallimard, 1994, pp.136-156<\/p>\n FOUCAULT, Michel, \u201eQu’est-ce que les Lumi\u00e8res?\u201c, \u00een Dits et \u00e9crits<\/em>, Vol. 4, Gallimard, 1994, pp. 562-577<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Bibliografie secundar\u0103:<\/strong><\/p>\n DREYFUS, Hubert L. & RABINOW, Paul, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics<\/em>, University of Chicago Press, 1982<\/p>\n GROS, Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric, Michel Foucault<\/em>, Presses Universitaires de France, 2017, versiune ePub<\/p>\n IFTODE, Cristian \u201eCinismul \u0219i practica adev\u0103rului\u201c, \u00een Critic\u0103, marginalitate, cinism<\/em>, Cristian Iftode, Cristina Voinea (eds.), Editura Universit\u0103\u021bii din Bucure\u0219ti, 2016, pp. 35-80<\/p>\n IYER, Arun, \u201eDeath\u201c, \u00een The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon<\/em>, Leonard Lawlor and John Nale (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 94-98<\/p>\n LORENZINI, Daniele, \u201eFoucault, the History of Truth and the Genealogy of the Modern Subject\u201c, \u00een Sociological Problems<\/em>, 3\u20134. 2016, pp. 219-233<\/p>\n TAYLOR, Charles, \u201eFoucault on Freedom and Truth\u201c, \u00een Political Theory<\/em>, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May, 1984), pp. 152-183<\/p>\n <\/p>\n # Note<\/p>\n [1]<\/a> Michel Foucault, \u201eSubjectivity And Truth\u201c, prelegere sus\u021binut\u0103 \u00een limba englez\u0103 \u00een data de 17 noiembrie 1980, \u0219i \u201eChristianity And Confession\u201c din 24 noiembrie 1980, versiuni u\u0219or schimbate a unei alte serii de prelegeri avute loc la University of California, Berkeley, ap\u0103rute \u00een About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self. Lectures at Dartmouth College, 1980<\/em>, Edited by Henri-Paul Fruchaud and Daniele Lorenzini, The University of Chicago Press, 2016, aici citate din Political Theory<\/em>, Vol. 21, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 198-227.<\/p>\n [2]<\/a> \u201eUne telle analyse, on le voit, ne rel\u00e8ve pas de l\u2019histoire des id\u00e9es ou des sciences : c\u2019est plut\u00f4t une \u00e9tude qui s\u2019efforce de retrouver \u00e0 partir de quoi connaissances et th\u00e9ories ont \u00e9t\u00e9 possibles; selon quel espace d\u2019ordre s\u2019est constitu\u00e9 le savoir; sur fond de quel a priori<\/em> historique et dans l\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ment de quelle positivit\u00e9 des id\u00e9es ont pu appara\u00eetre, des sciences se constituer, des exp\u00e9riences se r\u00e9fl\u00e9chir dans des philosophies, des rationalit\u00e9s se former, pour, peut-\u00eatre, se d\u00e9nouer et s\u2019\u00e9vanouir bient\u00f4t.\u201c, Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses<\/em>, Gallimard, 1966, p. 13.<\/p>\n [3]<\/a> \u201eSi on [le] compare \u00e0 [celui] des ex\u00e9g\u00e8tes et des th\u00e9rapeutes, ses anc\u00eatres et parrains, le labeur du philosophe appara\u00eet maintenant bien l\u00e9ger et discret \u2013 doucement inutile : le philosophe doit dire tout simplement ce qu\u2019il y a<\/em>. Non pas l\u2019\u00eatre, ni les choses m\u00eames, car il faudrait d\u00e9voiler, revenir \u00e0 un originaire \u00e0 la fois pr\u00e9sent et retir\u00e9, retrouver le vraiment na\u00eff \u00e0 travers l\u2019usure du familier, traverser en sens inverse toutes les accumulations de l\u2019oubli. Mais ce qu\u2019il y a, sans recul ni distance dans l\u2019instant m\u00eame o\u00f9 il parle. Et le philosophe sera quitte s\u2019il lui arrive, enfin, de ramener, pour le faire scintiller un moment au filet de ses mots, ce que c\u2019est qu\u2019\u00ab aujourd\u2019hui \u00bb. Il est seulement l\u2019homme du jour et du moment : passager, plus pr\u00e8s que personne du passage.\u201c Michel Foucault, Le discours philosophique<\/em>, Seuil\/EHESS\/Gallimard, 2023, p. 17.<\/p>\n [4]<\/a> \u201eI don’t feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning\u201c. \u201eOne Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault, October 25, 1982\u201c, intervievat de Rux Martin, \u00een Technologies of the Self. A Seminar with Michel Foucault<\/em>, Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (eds.), The University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.<\/p>\n [5]<\/a> Michel Foucault, Le\u00e7ons sur la volont\u00e9 de savoir. Cours au Coll\u00e8ge de France (1970-1971)<\/em>, Seuil\/Gallimard, 2011, p. 206.<\/p>\n [6]<\/a> \u201ePourquoi Nietzsche g\u00e9n\u00e9alogiste r\u00e9cuse-t-il, au moins en certaines occasions, la recherche de l’origine (Ursprung<\/em>) ? Parce que d’abord on s’efforce d’y recueillir l’essence exacte de la chose, sa possibilit\u00e9 la plus pure, son identit\u00e9 soigneusement repli\u00e9e sur elle-m\u00eame, sa forme immobile et ant\u00e9rieure \u00e0 tout ce qui est extr\u00eame, accidentel et successif. Rechercher une telle origine, c\u2019est essayer de retrouver \u00ab ce qui \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00bb, le \u00ab cela m\u00eame \u00bb d’une image exactement ad\u00e9quate \u00e0 soi ; c\u2019est tenir pour adventices toutes les p\u00e9rip\u00e9ties qui ont pu avoir lieu, toutes les ruses et tous les d\u00e9guisements ; c’est entreprendre de lever tous les masques, pour d\u00e9voiler enfin une identit\u00e9 premi\u00e8re. Or, si le g\u00e9n\u00e9alogiste prend soin d’\u00e9couter l’histoire plut\u00f4t que d’ajouter foi \u00e0 la m\u00e9taphysique, qu’apprend-il ? Que derri\u00e8re les choses il y a \u00ab tout autre chose \u00bb : non point leur secret essentiel et sans date, mais le secret qu’elles sont sans essence, ou que leur essence fut construite pi\u00e8ce a pi\u00e8ce \u00e0 partir de figures qui lui \u00e9taient \u00e9trang\u00e8res. La raison ? Mais elle est n\u00e9e d’une fa\u00e7on tout \u00e0 fait \u00ab raisonnable \u00bb – du hasard\u201c, Michel Foucault, \u201eNietzsche, g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie, l’histoire\u201c, \u00een Dits et \u00e9crits<\/em>, Vol. 2, Gallimard, 1994, p.138.<\/p>\n [7]<\/a> \u201eMais \u00e0 l\u2019exp\u00e9rience de l\u2019homme, un corps est donn\u00e9 qui est son corps \u2013 fragment d\u2019espace ambigu, dont la spatialit\u00e9 propre et irr\u00e9ductible s\u2019articule cependant sur l\u2019espace des choses \u201c, Michel Foucault, Les Mots et les Choses<\/em>, p. 325.<\/p>\n [8]<\/a> \u201eThe genealogist is a diagnostician who concentrates on the relations of power, knowledge, and the body in modern society.\u201c, Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics<\/em>, University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 105<\/p>\n [9]<\/a> \u201e(\u2026) un retour \u00e0 soi comme lib\u00e9ration s\u2019op\u00e9rant dans l\u2019immanence du monde ; elle n\u2019est pas rupture mais ach\u00e8vement, accomplissement d\u2019un retour \u00e0 soi : processus continu d\u2019autosubjectivation. Cette conversion du regard qui accepte de se tourner vers soi ne prend pas pour autant la forme d\u2019une contemplation narcissique, ou d\u2019un examen douloureux de ses imperfections. Il s\u2019agit d\u2019une concentration sur soi de type athl\u00e9tique : effort et tension maintenus dans la trajectoire de soi \u00e0 soi.\u201c Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Gros, Michel Foucault<\/em>, Presses Universitaires de France, 2017, versiune ePub, Cap. III. \u201eLes pratiques de subjectivation\u201c, Subcap. III \u201eLe souci de soi\u201c, \u00a75.<\/p>\n [10]<\/a> \u201eThe vantage point of death brings to the fore the truth of one\u2019s present and past. The past and the present are stripped of all the delusion and denials one normally harbors when one is secure in the knowledge that death is nowhere near. To think of one\u2019s death is not to think of the future but is only a means to ascertain the true value of one\u2019s present and past life.\u201c Arun Iyer, \u201eDeath\u201c, \u00een The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon<\/em>, Leonard Lawlor and John Nale (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 97.<\/p>\n [11]<\/a> \u201eL’ontologie critique de nous-m\u00eames, il faut la consid\u00e9rer non certes comme une th\u00e9orie, une doctrine, ni m\u00eame un corps permanent de savoir qui s’accumule; il faut la concevoir comme une attitude, un ethos<\/em>, une vie philosophique ou la critique de ce que nous sommes est \u00e0 la fois analyse historique des limites qui nous sont pos\u00e9es et \u00e9preuve de leur franchissement possible.\u201c, Michel Foucault, \u201eQu’est-ce que les Lumi\u00e8res?\u201c, \u00een Dits et \u00e9crits<\/em>, Vol. 4, Gallimard, 1994, p. 577.<\/p>\n [12]<\/a> Michel Foucault, \u201eNietzsche, la g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie, l’histoire\u201c, pp. 144-145.<\/p>\n [13]<\/a> Ibid., p. 144.<\/p>\n [14]<\/a> \u201eL’histoire sera \u00ab effective \u00bb dans la mesure o\u00f9 elle introduira le discontinu dans notre \u00eatre m\u00eame. Elle divisera nos sentiments; elle dramatisera nos instincts; elle multipliera notre corps et l’opposera \u00e0 lui-m\u00eame.\u201c Ibid., p. 147.<\/p>\n [15]<\/a> Ibid., p. 156. \u00cen acest sens, de cunoa\u0219tere sacrificial\u0103, se poate face o leg\u0103tur\u0103 direct\u0103 cu pharmakon<\/em>-ul lui Derrida, \u00een acela\u0219i timp remediu \u0219i otrav\u0103. De\u0219i Derrida folose\u0219te termenul \u00een contextul limbajului, Foucault prive\u0219te genealogia \u0219i ca palimpsest \u2013 pergamentele, documentele care au fost scrise si rescrise (chiar \u00een primul paragraf al eseului: \u201eLa g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie est grise; elle est m\u00e9ticuleuse et patiemment documentaire. Elle travaille sur des parchemins embrouill\u00e9s, gratt\u00e9s, plusieurs fois r\u00e9crits.\u201c, Id. p. 136).<\/p>\n [16]<\/a> \u201e(…) une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 dispers\u00e9e, discontinue, interrompue, qui ne parlerait ou qui ne se produirait que de temps en temps, l\u00e0 o\u00f9 elle veut, en certains lieux ; une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 qui ne se produit pas partout tout le temps, ni pour tout le monde ; une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 qui ne nous attend pas, car c’est une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 qui a ses instants favorables, ses lieux propices, ses agents et ses porteurs privil\u00e9gi\u00e9s.\u201c Michel Foucault, Le pouvoir psychiatrique. Cours au Coll\u00e8ge de France (1973-1974)<\/em>, Seuil\/Gallimard, 2003,\u00a0 p. 236.<\/p>\n [17]<\/a> Ibid., pp. 238-239.<\/p>\n [18]<\/a> \u201eLa v\u00e9rit\u00e9 n’est donn\u00e9e au sujet qu’\u00e0 un prix qui met en jeu l’\u00eatre m\u00eame du sujet\u201c. Michel Foucault, L’herm\u00e9neutique du sujet. Cours au Coll\u00e8ge de France (1981-1982)<\/em>, Seuil\/Gallimard, 2001, p. 17.<\/p>\n [19]<\/a> \u201e(…) un travail de soi sur soi, une \u00e9laboration de soi sur soi, une transformation progressive de soi sur soi dont on est soi-m\u00eame responsable dans un long labeur qui est celui de l’asc\u00e8se (ask\u00easis<\/em>)\u201c. Loc. cit.<\/p>\n [20]<\/a> \u201eTwo hitherto-hidden theoretical paradoxes could no longer be avoided. The first one was that the philosophy of consciousness had failed to found a philosophy of knowledge, and especially scientific knowledge, and the second was that this philosophy of meaning paradoxically had failed to take into account the formative mechanisms of signification and the structure of systems of meaning.\u201c Michel Foucault, \u201eSubjectivity And Truth, p. 202.<\/p>\n [21]<\/a> \u201eThe grand strategies of the macrocontexts – state, ruling class, or whatever – form the context in which the microrelations come to be, modify, or reproduce themselves; and reciprocally these provide the soil and point of anchorage for the grand strategies. Thus more than saying that power comes from the bottom, we should say that there is endless relation of reciprocal conditioning between global and microcontexts.\u201c Charles Taylor, \u201eFoucault on Freedom and Truth\u201c, \u00een Political Theory<\/em>, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May, 1984), p. 167.<\/p>\n [22]<\/a> Michel Foucault, \u201eNietzsche, la g\u00e9n\u00e9alogie, l’histoire\u201c, p. 154.<\/p>\n [23]<\/a> \u00cen cre\u0219tinism, exomologesis<\/em> \u0219i exagoreusis<\/em> ca tehnici confesionale au semnifica\u021bia restrictiv\u0103 a sacrificiului de sine, pe c\u00e2nd \u0219i confesionalul greco-roman, \u0219i institu\u021biile moderne judiciare, psihiatrice, politice \u0219i filosofice caut\u0103 fondarea hermeneuticii, \u00een\u021belegerii sinelui pe o pozitivitate emergent\u0103. \u00cen final, rolul tehnologiilor sinelui, ne spune Foucault, nu este nici de a face o interpretare indefinit\u0103 ca subordonare fa\u021b\u0103 de contemplarea divinului, nici fundamentarea pe un postament pozitiv al constituirii de sine, ci de politizare a sinelui ca guvernare responsabil\u0103. Vezi Michel Foucault, \u201eChristianity And Confession\u201c, p. 222-223.<\/p>\n [24]<\/a> \u201e\u0218tim c\u0103, \u00eempotriva unui concept de putere strict represiv, Foucault a eviden\u021biat modul \u00een care puterea este productiv\u0103: (a) produce \u00abadev\u0103r\u00bb; (b) \u00abfabric\u0103\u00bb identit\u0103\u021bi prin imprimarea unui anumit tip de raportare la sine \u2013 g\u00e2nditorul francez era ini\u021bial interesat de subiectivarea \u00abbiopolitic\u0103\u00bb, adic\u0103 de m\u0103sura \u00een care subiectul este activ \u00een procesul supunerii (assujettissement<\/em>) sale, altfel spus, \u00een care nu este niciodat\u0103 vorba de simpl\u0103 \u00abservitudine voluntar\u0103\u00bb; (c) totodat\u0103, raporturile de putere, complexe \u0219i reversibile, reprezint\u0103 oric\u00e2nd o surs\u0103 de pl\u0103cere. S\u0103 ad\u0103ug\u0103m, la acestea, faptul c\u0103 leg\u0103tura dintre guvernamentalitate, subiectivare \u0219i veridic\u021bie reprezint\u0103 articula\u021bia cea mai important\u0103 \u00een problematiz\u0103rile foucauldiene t\u00e2rzii.\u201c Cristian Iftode, \u201eCinismul \u0219i practica adev\u0103rului\u201c, \u00een Critic\u0103, marginalitate, cinism<\/em>, Cristian Iftode, Cristina Voinea (eds.), Editura Universit\u0103\u021bii din Bucure\u0219ti, 2016, pp. 53-54.<\/p>\n [25]<\/a> Daniele Lorenzini, \u201eFoucault, the History of Truth and the Genealogy of the Modern Subject\u201c, \u00een Sociological Problems<\/em>, 3\u20134. 2016, p. 232.<\/p>\n [26]<\/a> \u201eI became more and more aware that there is in all societies, I think, in all societies whatever they are, another type of techniques: techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on. Let’s call this kind of techniques a techniques or technology of the self.\u201c Michel Foucault, \u201eSubjectivity And Truth\u201c, p. 203.<\/p>\n [27]<\/a> Daniele Lorenzini, Op. cit., p. 230.<\/p>\n [28]<\/a> Michel Foucault, Op. cit., p. 204.<\/p>\n [29]<\/a> \u201e(…) a subject could not have access to the truth if he did not first operate upon himself a certain work which would make him susceptible to knowing the truth – a work of purification, conversion of the soul by contemplation of the soul itself.\u201c Michel Foucault, \u201eOn the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress\u201c, \u00een Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics<\/em>, p. 251.<\/p>\n [30]<\/a> Michel Foucault, \u201eSubjectivity And Truth\u201c, p. 209.<\/p>\n [31]<\/a> \u201eL’homme moderne, pour Baudelaire, n’est pas celui qui part \u00e0 la d\u00e9couverte de lui-m\u00eame, de ses secrets et de sa v\u00e9rit\u00e9 cach\u00e9e; il est celui qui cherche \u00e0 s’inventer lui-m\u00eame. Cette modernit\u00e9 ne lib\u00e8re pas l’homme en son \u00eatre propre; elle l’astreint \u00e0 la tache de s’\u00e9laborer lui-m\u00eame.\u201c Michel Foucault, \u201eQu’est-ce que les Lumi\u00e8res?\u201c, p. 571.<\/p>\n [32]<\/a> \u201eLe dehors n\u2019est pas une limite fig\u00e9e, mais une mati\u00e8re mouvante anim\u00e9e de mouvements p\u00e9ristaltiques, de plis et plissements qui constituent un dedans : non pas autre chose que le dehors, mais exactement le dedans du dehors.\u201c Gilles Deleuze, Foucault<\/em>, Les \u00c9ditions de Minuit, 2013, versiune ePub, Cap. \u201eLes plissements, ou le dedans de la pens\u00e9e (subjectivation)\u201c, \u00a73.<\/p>\n
\n[Oscar Wilde, Only Dull People Are Brilliant at Breakfast]<\/em><\/p>\n